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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KENNETH S. DICK,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43667
Ada County Case No.
CR-2014-5888

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Dick failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by denying his
Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence of 10 years, with four years fixed,
imposed upon his guilty plea to felony domestic violence?

Dick Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
In April 2014, Dick battered his fiancée, Emily, who had been living with him for
the past eight months. (PSI, p.3. 1) Dick “pushed her down twice in the driveway which
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Dick
43667 psi.pdf.”
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caused her to fall over the decorative half-wall and left an abrasion on her back.” (PSI,
p.3.) Emily ran into the house and locked all of the doors, but Dick gained entry into the
home through the garage door and “pushed her on to their bed, straddled her, and
punched her in the face between eight (8) and ten (10) times with closed fists.” (PSI,
p.3.) He also “encircled her neck with both of his hands three (3) times and cut off her
airway for between three (3) to five (5) seconds each time. During the incident … [Dick]
called her names and she said she feared for her life.” (PSI, p.3.) Emily was able to get
away from Dick and called the police, at which time Dick fled the residence. (PSI, p.3.)
When officers responded, they noted Emily had “red marks” on both sides of her neck,
abrasions under her jaw and on her back, and a swollen left eye. (PSI, p.3.) Shortly
thereafter, Meridian police conducted a traffic stop on Dick’s vehicle and arrested him
for DUI. (PSI, p.3.) Dick refused to participate in field sobriety tests, but submitted to
breathalyzer testing, which returned results of .153/.143 BAC. (PSI, p.3.)
The state charged Dick with attempted strangulation, felony domestic violence,
unlawful possession of a firearm, and misdemeanor DUI (second within 10 years). (R.,
pp.60-62.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dick pled guilty to felony domestic violence
and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., p.70.) Approximately one week
before his sentencing hearing, Dick was arrested for violating the no contact order with
the victim and for DUI. (PSI, pp.112-113.)
At the sentencing hearing for the instant offense, the district court imposed a
unified sentence of 10 years, with four years fixed. (R., pp.70-73.) Dick filed a timely
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied on March 24,
2015. (R., pp.75-84, 106-111.) On October 13, 2015, Dick filed a Motion to Allow Late
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Notice of Appeal Rule 35, together with a copy of his notice of appeal, asserting he
delivered his notice of appeal to the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office for mailing on May
5, 2015. (R., pp.112-118.) On October 27, 2015, the district court entered an order
directing the clerk to file Dick’s notice of appeal, and the notice of appeal was filed the
same day.

(R., pp.123-128.)

On November 9, 2015, this Court entered an order

conditionally dismissing Dick’s appeal. (Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal.) Dick
subsequently filed a response to the conditional dismissal and, on January 13, 2016,
this Court entered an order withdrawing the conditional dismissal.
Conditional Dismissal; Order Withdrawing Conditional Dismissal.)

(Response to
Dick’s notice of

appeal – if submitted to jail officials on May 5, 2015 – was timely, under the prison
mailbox rule, 2 only from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.

(R.,

pp.125-128.)
Dick asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion
for a reduction of sentence in light of his claim the court “did not exercise due caution
when it considered, at sentencing, the facts of [his] arrest” for violation of a no contact
order and DUI, which occurred after he pled guilty to the instant offense. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.4-6; R., p.66.) Dick has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a
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Under the “mailbox rule,” notices of appeal filed by inmates are deemed to be filed on
the date they are delivered to prison officials for filing with the court. State v. Lee, 117
Idaho 203, 786 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1990), cited with approval in Munson v. State, 128
Idaho 639, 917 P.2d 796 (1996).
3

sentence.” The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Absent the presentation of new evidence,
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review
the underlying sentence.” Id. Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440,
442 (2008).
Dick did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case, and he provided no
new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. He merely argued his sentence
should be reduced because he felt he “was assumed guilty of the [violation of a no
contact order and DUI] misdemeanors before [he] was allowed the opportunity of due
process of [sic] the misdemeanors,” and his sentencing in this case “should have been
postponed until after [he] was allowed due process and proven [his] innocence” in the
new case. (R., pp.76-77.) In the same motion, Dick admitted he violated the no contact
order on at least two occasions and that he drove “despite [his] inability to drive,” but
justified his conduct by claiming the victim had been removing property from his
residence, where she and her children resided for the eight months preceding the
instant offense. (R., pp.78-80; PSI, p.3.) This information was available at the time of
sentencing; however, Dick chose not to provide the information he felt should have
been considered, and specifically declined to clarify or add to the information contained
in the police reports detailing the new DUI and no contact order violation – although he
was given the opportunity, at sentencing, to do so. (Tr., p.7, L.16 – p.8, L.5; p.24, L.18
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– p.25, L.19.) He also failed to request the continuance to which he later claimed he
was entitled, and in fact, when asked at sentencing whether there was any legal reason
as to why sentence should not be imposed at that time, his counsel stated there was
not. (Tr., p.25, Ls.21-24.)
Rule 35 functions to allow a defendant to request leniency in light of “new or
additional” information that was not available at the time of sentencing, not to allow a
defendant to purposefully withhold information that was clearly available at the time of
sentencing so he can later present it as “new” for the purpose of a Rule 35 motion.
Because Dick presented no new information in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed
to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence is excessive. Having failed to make
such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s
order denying his Rule 35 motion.
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Dick’s claim, he has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. On appeal, Dick argues the district court “did not
exercise due caution when it considered, at sentencing, the facts of [his] arrest” for
violation of a no contact order and DUI, which occurred after he pled guilty to the instant
offense, but before sentencing in this case. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-6; R., p.66.) The
district court has broad discretion in determining what evidence is to be admitted at a
sentencing hearing. State v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 947, 303 P.3d 627, 634 (Ct. App.
2013) (citations omitted). The sentencing judge is presumably able to ascertain the
relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and material presented to it
during the sentencing process and to disregard the irrelevant and unreliable. Id. at 947948, 303 P.3d at 634-635 (citations omitted). It is well established that a sentencing
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court may, with appropriate caution, consider a defendant's alleged criminal conduct for
which he has not been convicted or for which charges have been dismissed. State v.
Thomas, 133 Idaho 800, 804, 992 P.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted).
Dick’s assertion the district court “did not exercise due caution” when it
considered his new charges in sentencing him for the instant offense is without merit.
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) When sentencing Dick for the instant offense, the district court
expressly stated, “I agree with [Dick’s trial counsel] that these [new charges] are only
accusations at this point.”

(Tr., p.26, Ls.4-5 (emphasis added).)

The court noted,

however, that “a very thorough investigation was done by the police, according to the
reports that are contained here,” and consideration of the accusations was reasonable
particularly because the new charges involved the same victim and the same type of
criminal behavior. (Tr., p.26, Ls.5-10; R., p.109.) The court went on to articulate its
consideration of numerous other factors, including the seriousness of the instant
offense, the great harm done to the victim, Dick’s failure to accept full responsibility for
his criminal conduct, his ongoing alcohol abuse and violent criminal offending, and his
failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite his repeated convictions for crimes involving
his alcohol abuse and domestic violence. (Tr., p.26, L.11 – p.28, L.24.) As such, it is
clear the district court exercised “due caution” in considering Dick’s pending charges for
DUI and violation of a no contact order as “only accusations,” and it did not sentence
Dick based solely on the new charges. Dick has failed to establish the district court
erred by considering his pending charges.
Dick’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion because it “was not
aware of all the circumstances surrounding” the new charges likewise fails. (Appellant’s
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Brief, p.4.) As previously noted, Dick admitted in his Rule 35 motion that he violated the
no contact order with the victim on several occasions and that he drove “despite [his]
inability to drive.”

(R., pp.78-80.)

His argument in support of his Rule 35 motion

primarily consisted of setting forth justifications for his “poor decision” to violate the no
contact order and commit the new DUI – purportedly to “retrieve [his] property,” which
he felt the victim had wrongfully removed from the residence they previously shared.
(R., pp.78-80.) In its order denying Dick’s Rule 35 request, the district court advised
that Dick’s excuses for engaging in the newly charged criminal conduct, even if known
at the time of sentencing, “would not have affected the sentence.” (R., p.109.) The
court stated, “Defendant attempts to place blame on the victim as explanation for why
he violated the no contact order in this case; however, the facts alleged by Defendant
do not justify or provide new information to the crime to which he pled guilty.” (R.,
pp.109-110.) The court indicated it imposed Dick’s sentence based largely on “the
horrific nature of the crime” and “in order to protect society and deter Defendant.” (R.,
p.110.)

The district court also noted Dick’s “statement of ‘new’ facts is essentially

asking the Court to take into account mitigating circumstances for why he committed the
new charges against him that are not before this Court,” and, “Defendant’s allegations
that the victim ‘broke into his house and stole certain items’ are irrelevant to the fact that
Defendant horribly beat the victim before she allegedly did these bad acts, and
immaterial to the sentence imposed.” (R., p.110 (emphasis original).)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and appropriately
determined that Dick’s justifications for committing the new crimes did not merit a
reduction of his sentence for the instant offense, particularly in light of the egregious
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nature of the offense and the great harm done to the victim. The district court’s decision
not to reduce Dick’s sentence was also appropriate in light of Dick’s longstanding
pattern of abusive behavior and driving while intoxicated, his “moderate to high” risk to
violently reoffend, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite prior legal
sanctions and treatment opportunities. (PSI, pp.6-11, 14, 38.) Given any reasonable
view of the facts, Dick has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Dick’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
DATED this 17th day of May, 2016.

__/s/_________________________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of May, 2016, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_________________________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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